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Prejudgment Interest and Delay Damage Awards on
Breach of Contract and Related Damages: A
Comparative Analysis of New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania Law
I.

INTRODUCTION

A choice between Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York law can be
determinative of whether a party is able to recover prejudgment
interest on damages awarded for breach of contract (such as the
purchase price, lost profits, cost of repair and cover damages), tortious interference with contract and misrepresentation in contracting. Parties to a contract which may be governed by Pennsylvania, New York or Ohio law should carefully consider the
differences in the prejudgment interest law of Pennsylvania, New
York and Ohio when choosing the law governing disputes arising
out of the contract.
II.

RECOVERY OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON BREACH OF
CONTRACT DAMAGES

A. General Authority
1. Pennsylvania Law
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted section 337(a) of
the Restatement of Contracts' regarding the awardability of prejudgment interest in breach of contract actions.' In accordance
with the Restatement, interest is recoverable as a matter of law
1. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337(a) (1932). Section 337(a) provides:
If the parties have not by contract determined otherwise, simple interest at the
statutory legal rate is recoverable as damages for breach of contract as follows:
(a) Where the defendant commits a breach of a contract to pay a definite sum
of money, or to render a performance the value of which in money is stated in
the contract or is ascertainable by mathematical calculation from a standard
fixed in the contract or from established market prices of the subject matter,
interest is allowed on the amount of the debt or money value from the time
performance was due, after making all the deductions to which the defendant
may be entitled.
Id.
2. Penneys v. Pennsylvania R.R., 408 Pa. 276, 278, 183 A.2d 544, 546 (1962). See also
Black Gold Coal Corp. v. Shawville Coal Co., 730 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1984).
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where there has been a breach of a promise to pay a "definite sum
of money, or to render a performance the value of which is ascertainable with exactitude."3 Implicit in this section is the requirement that the value of the debt be "liquidated."" A debt is considered "liquidated" under Pennsylvania law when its value is either
stated or ascertainable with exactitude in accordance with section
337(a) of the Restatement.5 The term "liquidated" is generally
used in Pennsylvania law to encompass both stated sums and those
ascertainable by computation.'
If interest is not awardable as a matter of right in accordance
with the Restatement because the debt is unliquidated, delay damages in the nature of interest may be awarded at the discretion of
the fact-finder.7 Factors to be considered by the fact-finder are
whether the award of compensation is fair and whether the wrongdoer was unjustly enriched or acted in bad faith.
2.. Ohio Law
Ohio has promulgated section 1343.03 of the Ohio Revised Code
regarding recovery of prejudgment interest.' The claim, under
Ohio law, must be either liquidated or readily ascertainable by the
debtor for prejudgment interest to be recoverable as a matter of
3. Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
4. Black Gold Coal Corp. v. Shawville Coal Co., 730 F.2d at 943.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Black Gold Coal Corp. v. Shawville Coal Co., 730 F.2d 941, 943 (1984).
7. Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., 417 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C.
423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973) (applying Pennsylvania law).
It is important to note that under Pennsylvania law, such discretionary awards are considered "delay damages" rather than "prejudgment interest." Cf. Ohio law, under which the
term "prejudgment interest" encompasses interest awarded both as the matter of law and in
the discretion of the fact-finder. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. The terminology
is not an issue under New York law because New York does not recognize discretionary
awards. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. See Nedd v. UMW, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1215-16 (M.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 726 F.2d 972
(3d Cir. 1984).
9. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03 (Page Supp. 1983). The relevant provisions of
section 1343.03 regarding recovery of prejudgment interest in a breach of contract action
are:
(A) [W]hen money becomes due and payable upon any. . . instrument of writing
. . . the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, and no
more, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in relation to the
money that becomes due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract.
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law. 10 Under Ohio law, the term "liquidated" does not encompass
the concept of "readily ascertainable."' 1 If the claim is unliquidated or not readily ascertainable, prejudgment interest may be
awarded in the fact-finder's discretion, if necessary to adequately
compensate the injured party for its loss. 12 As under Pennsylvania
law, 3 factors to be considered are unjust enrichment and bad
14
faith.
3.

New York Law

Pursuant to section 5001(a) of the New York Civil Practice
Law,' 5 prejudgment interest is awarded on damages arising from
breach of contract as a matter of right.'" Unlike Ohio and Pennsylvania, however, New York has eliminated the requirement that
damages be "liquidated" or "ascertainable" in order to accrue interest.7 Awards of prejudgment interest are computed from the
10. Nursing Staff of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Sherman, 13 Ohio App. 3d 328, 469 N.E.2d
1031 (1984) (relying on Shaker Savings Ass'n v. Greenwood Village, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 3d
141, 454 N.E.2d 984 (1982)); Braverman v. Spriggs, 68 Ohio App. 2d 58, 426 N.E.2d 526
(1980). In Shaker Savings, the court of appeals explained the alternative standard that the
amount of the debt be readily ascertainable:
In Ohio, prejudgment interest. . . will not be denied although the sum due is unliquidated where the amount is capable of ascertainment by mere computation, or is
subject to reasonably certain calculation by reference to existing market values; but
where computation is based on market values, such values must be well established
and knowledge thereof must be accessible to the debtor ....
7 Ohio App. at 143. 454 N.E.2d at 986 (quoting McKinney v. White Sewing Mach. Corp., 32
Ohio Op. 2d 306, 200 N.E.2d 596 (1964)).
11. See Shaker Savings Ass'n v. Greenwood Village, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 3d 141, 143, 454
N.E.2d 984, 986. Compare with the Pennsylvania standard under which the term "liquidated" encompasses the concept of "readily ascertainable." See Black Gold Coal Corp. v.
Shawville Coal Co., 730 F.2d at 943.
12. Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 995 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N.E. 409 (1890).
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14. See Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 995 (discretionary prejudgment interest awarded where wrongdoer had been unjustly enriched); Clevenger v. Westfield Cos., 60 Ohio App. 2d 1, 4, 395 N.E. 2d 377, 379 (1978) (discretionary
prejudgment interest awarded where wrongdoer had not made reasonable offer to settle).
15. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5001(a) (McKinney 1963):
(a) Actions in which recoverable. Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded
because of a breach of performance of a contract, or because of an act or omission
depriving or otherwise interfering with title to, or possession or enjoyment of, property, except that in an action of an equitable nature, interest and the rate and date
from which it shall be computed shall be in the court's discretion.
Id.
16. Earnest v. Donald Deskey Assocs., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Rock Transp. Properties Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 312 F. Supp.
341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Webster v. Culver Roadways, Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 256, 259, 359
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"earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed.""8
B.

Recovery of Purchase Price

1. Pennsylvania Law
Under Pennsylvania law, an amount stated as due under a contract or ascertainable by rates in a contract is clearly liquidated
and, therefore, accrues interest from the date of non-payment as a
matter of right.19 The sum is liquidated even if liability is contested.20 If the purchase price recovered by an injured party is either stated in the contract or ascertainable by reference to rates
and quantities therein, the injured party will recover interest on
any award of damages it receives for late payment of the purchase
price.21 If there is no breach of contract, the injured party is not
entitled to interest on any set-off damages it has against the other

party. 22
2.

Ohio Law

Ohio courts have clearly held that where an amount stated in
the contract as due thereunder is a certain sum, it is liquidated.2 3
This is so even if the other party denies owing the claim. 24 Therefore, assuming the purchase price is set forth in the contract, the
claim is liquidated and will accrue prejudgment interest even if
there is a dispute over whether or not the purchase price is owed.
Interest accrues from the date of substantial compliance.25
N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1974).
18. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5001(b) (McKinney 1963):
(b) Date from which computed. Interest shall be computed from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed, except that interest upon damages incurred
thereafter shall be computed from the date incurred. Where such damages were incurred at various times, interest shall be computed upon each item from the date it
was incurred or upon all of the damages from a single reasonable intermediate date.

Id.
19.
Inc. v .
20.
21.
22.
23.
(1980).
24.
25.

See, e.g., Black Gold Coal Corp. v. Shawville Coal Co., 730 F.2d at 943; E.C. Ernst,
Koppers Co., 626 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1980).
E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 626 F.2d at 332.
Id.
See Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Metals Div., 417 F.. Supp. at 969.
See, e.g., Braverman v. Spriggs, 68 Ohio App. 2d 58, 59, 426 N.E.2d 526, 527
Id. at 60, 426 N.E. 2d at 527.
See Sealey v. Boulevard Constr. Co., 70 Ohio App. 2d 277, 437 N.E.2d 305 (1980).

1985
3.

Prejudgment Interest

1101

New York Law

Under New York law, prejudgment interest on the recovery of
the purchase price in a breach of contract action is clearly recoverable.2" A recovery of purchase price is a "sum awarded because of
breach of performance of a contract."2 7
C.

Recovery of Lost Profits, Costs of Repair

1. Pennsylvania Law
Pennsylvania courts have held that damages such as lost profits
and costs of repair are not liquidated under section 337(a) of the
Restatement and, therefore, interest thereon is not recoverable as
a matter of right under Pennsylvania law.2" Only damages for nonperformance, rather than defective performance, can be liquidated
within the meaning of section 337(a). 29
There is some authority in the comments to section 337 of the
Restatement for an award of interest even though the amount of
damages is unliquidated where the nonbreaching party claims that
the breaching party has unjustly cancelled the contract, and requests an award of the profits lost due to the cancellation, with
interest.3 0 There appear to be no decisions under Pennsylvania law
26. N.Y.CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5001(a) (McKinney 1963). See Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 425 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., 417 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977); Willred Co. v. Westmoreland Metal Mfg. Co.,
200 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C.
423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973). Accord Barney Mach. Co. v. Continental MDM, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (prejudgment interest awarded on return of purchase price paid;
no interest awarded on lost profits due to breach of warranty).
29. Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711
(1973).
30. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337 comment h (1932). Comment h provides in
pertinent part:
The fact that the defendant's breach has prevented the plaintiff from rendering performance of some condition precedent to his right to full payment by the defendant,
or has otherwise saved expense to the plaintiff, does not prevent the recovery of interest. In such cases, the plaintiff's claim is reduced by the amount that he can reasonably be expected to save out of the wreck. The amount of this reduction is nearly
always unliquidated and uncertain, so that the balance payable by the defendant is
also uncertain. But full performance would have put the plaintiff in possession of the
full amount promised, with the value of its use from the day of payment. The balance
due from the defendant is less than this full amount, and its uncertainty prior to
verdict does not prevent the allowance of interest.
Id. (emphasis added). Further, example 6 to section 337(a) provides that interest can be
obtained on the value of profits lost due to repudiation of a contract:
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allowing, or even discussing, an award of interest in accordance
with comment h or illustration 6 to section 337(a) of the Restatement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has adopted the
section of the Restatement, section 337(a), to which this example
and comment refer. 3 1
If interest is not awardable as a matter of right under section
337(a) of the Restatement, delay damages may be awarded in the
discretion of the fact-finder. 2 If it can be shown that the breaching
party acted in bad faith or was unjustly enriched at its expense,
there is authority for an award of delay damages in the discretion
of the jury.3"
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania applied these principles in Hussey Metals Division v. Lectromelt
Furnace Division,3' which involved a dispute for recovery of the
purchase price, repair costs and lost profits.3 5 The plaintiff in Hussey Metals had purchased a furnace from the defendant and paid
part of the purchase price.36 The furnace was defective and, as a
result, the plaintiff incurred labor and supply expenses in attempting repairs, and also incurred lost profits.3 7 The plaintiff withheld
the balance of the purchase price and sued for recovery of the
purchase price paid, repair costs and lost profits, plus interest.3
The district court reviewed whether interest was allowable as a
matter of law under the Restatement, and if not, whether discretionary interest should be allowed. 39 It held that interest was unrecoverable both as a matter of law and of fact.' 0 Because the damages were not -liquidated, it denied interest."' As an additional
A makes a contract for the future sale of a ship to B for $100,000, payment and
delivery to be June 1, 1928. Before time for delivery B repudiates. At the time and
place of delivery the sale value of the ship, as found by the jury, is $60,000. There are
no special losses suffered. A can get judgment for $40,000 with interest at the legal
rate from June 1, 1928.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337(a) illustration 6 (1932).
31. See Penneys v. Pennsylvania R.R., 408 Pa. 276, 279, 183 A.2d 544, 546 (1962).
32. See Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. at 444, 196 S.E.2d
at 724.
33. See Nedd v. UMW, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1215-16 (M.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 726 F.2d
972 (3d Cir. 1984).
34. 417 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 968.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 966-69.
40. Id. at 968-69.
41. Id.
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ground for denying interest, the court noted that the parties had
excluded an award of interest on damages such as lost profits by
the exclusion of a consequential damage clause in their contract."2
The court acted as fact-finder regarding the issue of whether a
discretionary award of interest (delay damages) should be made
because the lower court had improperly withheld this question
from the jury. 3 The court denied discretionary interest." Two factors were instrumental in the court's decision: (1) the plaintiff had
received substantial use from the furnace, particularly during the
litigation, and (2) the contract between the parties had excluded
consequential damages.4 5
2.

Ohio Law

Because damages such as lost profits and cost of repairing defective products are of uncertain amount under the standard of
Braverman v. Spriggs," they are held to be unliquidated under
Ohio law. Therefore, the amounts must be "readily ascertainable"
in order to accrue prejudgment interest as a matter of law.47
Ohio courts have narrowly construed the "readily ascertainable
by computation" standard. 8 In 1980, the Ohio Court of Appeals in
Braverman v. Spriggs49 held that interest on an amount of net
profits payable under a contract was unrecoverable.5 0 The court
noted that two computations were necessary to determine the period for which the net profits accrued and the amount of net profits, and therefore denied the interest.5 1 In the recent case of Lewis
v. Seiler,52 however, the court of appeals held that an amount of
gross revenues payable under a contract was readily ascertainable
by reference to certain federal income tax returns, and awarded
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 68 Ohio App. 2d at 60, 426 N.E.2d at 527. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
47. See Nursing Staff of Cincinnati v. Sherman, 13 Ohio App. 3d 328, 469 N.E.2d 1031
(1984). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
48. See Lewis v. Seiler, No. 3300, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1984); Braverman v.
Spriggs, 68 Ohio App. 2d 58, 426 N.E.2d 526 (1980).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 59, 426 N.E.2d at 527-28 (citing Shawhan v. Van Nest, 25 Ohio St. 490
(1874)).
51. Id.
52. No. 3300, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1984).
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prejudgment interest on the amount.5 3 In so doing, the court cited
Braverman for the proposition that interest is allowed where
money due is based on the contract between the parties or is capable of ascertainment by computation."
The Lewis court did not discuss the distinguishing factor between the computation made in Lewis5" and that made in
Braverman.56 A possible distinction is that the contract in Lewis
specified that the percentage of gross revenues payable under the
contract was to be determined by reference to a stated source,
while the Braverman contract did not stipulate a method for computing net profits.
Under such a restrictive construction of the "readily ascertainable by computation" standard, damages such as lost profits and
costs of repair due to defective products under a contract do not
seem to be "readily ascertainable." If the.amounts of damages are
neither set forth in the contract between the parties, nor computable by reference to a standard stated in the contracts, prejudgment
interest on these damages would be denied.
In fact, there are very few cases applying Ohio law that even
mention prejudgment interest regarding damages such as lost profits and costs of repair due to breach of warranty. By their silence,
it appears that the courts have decided not to allow prejudgment
interest on such items. For example, opinions allowing recoveries
of lost profits due to breaches of contract under Ohio law generally
conclude with no comment on interest.5 7 Where interest is mentioned, it is either not awarded 58 or awarded on some other
ground. In Stephen's Machine & Tool, Inc., v. D. & H. Machine
Consultants,Inc.,6 for example, the court granted an award of lost
profits due to defective machinery delivered under the contract."
It did not award, nor discuss, interest on the lost profits, but did
allow a recovery of interest on the amount of a loan the purchaser
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Lewis v. Seiler, No. 3300, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1984).
56. Braverman v. Spriggs, 68 Ohio App. 2d 58, 426 N.E.2d 526.
57. See, e.g., Duplex Mill & Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 187 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1951); Queen
Incubator Co. v. Merrell Co., 21 Ohio App. 482, 153 N.E. 272 (1926).
58. Champion Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. Pennsylvania Ironworks Co., 68 Ohio St.
229, 67 N.E. 486 (1903).
59. 65 Ohio App. 2d 197, 417 N.E.2d 579 (1979).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 202-03, 417'N.E.2d at 584.
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had taken out to pay the purchase price. 2
If a claim is unliquidated or not readily ascertainable, an award
of prejudgment interest may be made in the discretion of the factfinder if it is necessary to fairly and adequately compensate the
injured party for its loss.63 This standard has been sparingly applied.6 4 The cases under Ohio law in which prejudgment interest
has been allowed on unliquidated and not readily ascertainable65
claims have involved damages payable under insurance policies
or damages arising from tortious conduct.66 In Essex House v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.67 the district court allowed prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim, stating that "an award
of prejudgment interest is grounded upon the need to give plaintiffs fair and adequate compensation for their covered losses."6 8 Although the court set forth this rationale for the award, it also specifically noted that the insurance company had received an
investment return on the insured's premium payments during the
eight years it had delayed payment of the claim. In Clevenger v.
Westfield Cos., 70 similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a
jury also would be justified in returning a discretionary award of
interest on an unliquidated claim if it found that the wrongdoer71
had not made a reasonable settlement offer to the injured party.
3.

New York Law

Because there is no requirement that the damages be liquidated,
prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of right under New
York law on damages such as lost profits and costs of repairs due
62. Id.
63. Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 995 (S.D. Ohio
1975); Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N.E. 409 (1890).
64. See Braverman v. Spriggs, 68 Ohio App. 2d at 60, 426 N.E.2d at 526, in which the
court held that prejudgment interest was unavailable because the debt was unliquidated,
and did not examine the discretionary standard of whether it was necessary to fully compensate the injured party. Id. at 528. There are no cases under Ohio law which have actually
applied this discretionary standard to an award of interest on consequential damages.
65. See Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ohio
1975); Clevenger v. Westfield Cos., 60 Ohio App. 2d 1, 395 N.E.2d 377 (1978).
66. See Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N.E. 409 (1890); Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
67. 404 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
68. Id. at 995.
69. Id.
70. 60 Ohio App. 2d 1, 395 N.E.2d 377 (1978).
71. Id. at 4, 395 N.E.2d at 379.
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to breach of performance of a contract.72 In Earnest v. Donald
Deskey Associates, Inc.,7 3 the plaintiff recovered lost profits and
repair expenses incurred due to the defendant's breach of warranty
in supplying defective products. 74 The district court awarded prejudgment interest on the entire damage award, including lost profits and repair expenses. 75 Because the court was unable to ascertain a date by which the lost profits and other damages were
incurred, it awarded prejudgment interest from the date that the
plaintiff commenced the action.76
In 1981, the district court again addressed the issue of the time
period for calculation of interest on lost profits.7 7 In Morse v.
Swank, 78 the plaintiff requested that interest be computed from
the date of breach; the defendant requested that it run from a
"reasonable intermediate date" each year since the verdict was for
lost profits which would have been earned over a three year period. 79 The court rejected both requests.80 Because the evidence
was "not conclusive of when profits would have accrued to plaintiff," it held that interest would be computed from the date the
action commenced. 81
In accordance with the above authorities, prejudgment interest
is recoverable under New York law on damages for lost profits and
costs of repair due to a breach of warranty. Interest is generally
computed from the date the plaintiff began the action. If, however,
conclusive evidence of when profits would have accrued is
presented, 2 interest accrues from that date rather than the date
on which the action was commenced.
72. See Morse v. Swank, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 688 F.2d 816
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. S.A.R.L. DeGestion Pierre Cardin v. Morse, 103 S. Ct.
75 (1982); Earnest v. Donald Deskey Assocs., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Arigo
v. Abbott & Cobb, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 958, 448 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1982).
73. 312 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
74. Id. at 1313.
75. See id. at 1313-14, where the court stated: "In a diversity action based on breach
of performance of a contract, preverdict interest is due in a matter of right, pursuant to the
provisions of N.Y. CPLR § 5001." Id.
76. Id. at 1314. Accord Temple Beth Shalom v. E.M. Fitzsimmons and Assocs., Inc., 42
A.D.2d 739, 345 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1973) (court unable to determine from the record when the
warranty was breached and thus allowed interest from the date on which the action was
commenced).
77. Morse v. Swank, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80. Id. at 830.
81.
82.

Id.
See Morse v. Swank, Inc., 520 F. Supp. at 830.
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C. Recovery of Additional Labor and Supply Costs Due to
Breach
1.

Pennsylvania Law

When a contract is voided, any award of interest on damages
arising thereunder falls outside of the scope of section 337(a) of the
Restatement." In such case, the fact-finder may award compensation for delay in the nature of interest.8 4 Further, where the damages are not for the value of performance as stated under the contract (the measure of damages set forth in the Restatement), but
rather the difference between the cost incurred by the nonbreaching party in obtaining the substitute goods and performance and
the cost of the breaching party's performance under the contract,
the damages are unliquidated; interest on these damages is not allowable as a matter of right, but may be allowed at the fact8
finder's discretion. 5
The conclusion that interest is not allowable as a matter of right
on these damages is supported by the many opinions under Pennsylvania law which neither mention nor award interest on damages
of additional costs incurred in covering the contract." Discretion87
ary awards of interest on such damages have been affirmed.
2.

Ohio Law

Damages for the difference between the cost of obtaining substitute goods and performance and the cost of the breaching party's
performance under the contract are not liquidated under Ohio
law8 8 and, therefore, in order to be recoverable as a matter of law,
they must be "readily ascertainable." 89 Where cover damages are
not generally ascertainable by reference to a source stated in the
contract," they would not be "readily ascertainable." 9 1 Nevertheless, interest could be awarded on such damages if, at the discre83. Interlake, Inc. v. Erie Indus. Trucks, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
84. Id. See also Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., 417 F. Supp. 964, 968
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977).
85. Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Furnance Div., 417 F. Supp. at 968.
86. See, e.g., Flood v. M.P. Clark, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Myers v.
Rubin, 399 Pa. 363, 160 A.2d 559 (1960); Burton v. Miller, 227 Pa. 143, 75 A. 1035 (1910);
Welty v. Parry, 65 Pa. Super. 553 (1917).
87. See Galt v. Seaboard Constr. Co., 375 Pa. 613, 619, 101 A.2d 752, 754 (1954).
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
91. See Lewis v. Seiler, No. 3300, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1984).
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tion of the fact-finder, it is deemed necessary to adequately com92
pensate the injured party.
3.

New York Law

Because New York no longer distinguishes between liquidated
and nonliquidated damages, prejudgment interest is awarded
under New York law as a matter of law on damages for the difference between the cost of covering the contract and the contract
price."3
III.

RECOVERY OF DELAY DAMAGES OR INTEREST ON DAMAGES FOR
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT OR MISREPRESENTATION

A.

Pennsylvania Law

Because tort damages are unliquidated, prejudgment interest
thereon is not recoverable as a matter of law under Pennsylvania
law.9 ' In actions for compensation for damages arising from tortious conduct, however, the fact-finder may allow discretionary
damages "in the nature of interest" as compensation for the delay."0 As a result, where a contract is voided due to misrepresentation, interest on damages resulting therefrom is awardable at the
discretion of the fact-finder.9 6 Also, where damages are awarded for
tortious interference with contract, the fact-finder may in its dis92. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. In Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon
Steel Corp., the district court denied prejudgment interest on cover damages. See Roth
Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983), in which the court of appeals noted the lower court's decision. The issue was not discussed on appeal.
93. See Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); James King & Son, Inc. v. DeSantis Constr. No. 2 Corp., 65 A.D.2d 695, 410 N.Y.S.2d
2 (1978).
94. Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1981); Citizens' Natural Gas Co. v. Richards, 130 Pa. 37, 39-40, 18 A. 600, 600-01 (1889).
95. Citizens' Natural Gas Co. v. Richards, 130 Pa. at 39-40, 18 A. at 600, reaff'd in
Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72, 263 A.2d 336 (1970).
96. Interlake, Inc. v. Erie Indus. Trucks, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Proper considerations for the jury in making a discretionary award are whether an award of
interest is necessary to "fairly compensate" the injured party, whether the injured party was
unjustly enriched by its actions, and whether the injured party acted unreasonably regarding settlement of the case. See Nedd v. UMW, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1215-16 (M.D. Pa. 1980),
aff'd, 726 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp.,
283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973) (applying Pennsylvania law), in which the court remanded to the jury to determine whether interest should be added in order to fairly compensate the injured party. Id. at 724.
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cretion, award delay damages in the nature of- interest. 7
Another potential source of recovery of delay damages for a tort
claimant is set forth in Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure.9 8 Rule 238 provides that the court shall award, as a
matter of law, delay damages of ten percent on compensatory damages awarded for property damage.99 These delay damages are
computed from the latter of the date the complaint was filed or the
date one year after the cause of action accrued, to the date of the
award of damages. 10 0 Subsection (e) of Rule 238 provides that if
the defendant makes the plaintiff a written settlement offer which
the plaintiff refuses and the plaintiff does not recover more than
125% of the offer in the suit, no statutory delay damages are to be
awarded by the court after the date of the written offer. 1 ' An
award of statutory delay damages under Rule 238 does not preclude an award of common law delay damages for the period prior
to the filing of the complaint. 10
97. See Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979) (discretionary delay damages awarded on damages arising from tortious interference with
contract).
98. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Rule 238 provides in pertinent part:
(a) [I]n an action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage,
*..
the court ... shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages. . . in the verdict of a jury
. . . damages for delay at ten (10) percent per annum, not compounded ....
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintiff filed the initial
complaint in the action or from a date one year after the accrual of the cause
of action, whichever is later, up to the date of award ....
(d) The court may, and on request of a party shall, charge the jury that if it finds for
the plaintiff, it shall not award the plaintiff any damages for delay because this is a
matter for the court.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of settlement . . .
but the offer is not accepted and the plaintiff does not recover by award . . . more
than 125 percent of the offer, the court. . .shall not award damages for delay for the
period after the date the offer was made.
PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). See American Enka Co.
v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (3d Cir. 1982).
99. PA. R. Crv. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). The rule applies in diversity cases. Marks v. Mobile Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 774 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
aff'd, 727 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1984).
100. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(2), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
101. PA. R. Crv. P. 238(e), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
102. See American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1982), in
which the plaintiff recovered damages under Rule 238, and the circuit court remanded to
the lower court for reconsideration of whether common law delay damages should also be
allowed. Id. The Third Circuit noted that no duplication of Rule 238 delay damages and
common law delay damages could be awarded for the period between the filing of the corn-
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It is unclear whether the pecuniary loss caused by interference
with contractual relations or fraudulent representation in contracting will be considered "property damage" within the meaning
of Rule 238.103 If the damages for misrepresentation or tortious interference with contract are damages to property within the meaning of this statute, then (1) the applicable percentage of interest
would be increased from six to ten percent from the latter of the
time the complaint was filed or one year after the cause of action
accrued to the date of the verdict, and (2) assuming the tortfeasor
does not offer to settle within the guidelines of Rule 238(e), the
interest for such period would be awarded as a matter of right by
the court rather than at the fact-finder's discretion.
B.

Ohio Law

In July of 1982, the Ohio statutory provisions regarding prejudgment interest were amended to include interest recoveries on actions based on tortious conduct. 104 Under section 1343.03(C) of the
Ohio Revised Code, the court is to award interest on damages for
tortious conduct if the fact-finder determines that the tortfeasor
failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case while the party
to whom the damages are awarded did not fail to make such an
effort. 10 5 This standard appears to be a codification of the bad
faith settlement standard followed in the pre-statute cases regarding awards of discretionary interest in tort damages.' 0 6 Under section 1343.03(C), the interest is computed from the date the cause
plaint and the judgment. Id. at 1057. It is unclear from the opinion whether the defendant
had requested the court to instruct the jury not to award any delay damages in accordance
with subsection (d) of Rule 238.
103. To date, no cases have specifically addressed this issue.
104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(C) (Page Supp. 1983). Section 1343.03(C) of
the Ohio Revised Code, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
Interest on a judgment . . . for the payment of money rendered in a civil action
based on tortious conduct and not settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the cause of action accrued to the date on which the money is
paid, if, upon motion of any party to the action, the court determines at a hearing
held subsequent to the verdict or decision in the action that the party required to pay
the money failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the party to
whom the money is to be paid did not fail to make a good faith effort to settle the
case.

Id.
105. Id.
106. See Clevenger v. Westfield Cos., 60 Ohio App. 2d 1, 395 N.E.2d 377 (1978), in
which the court held that prejudgment interest should not be awarded if the defendant had
timely made a reasonable settlement offer. Id. at 4, 395 N.E.2d at 379. See also Essex House
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 995.
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10
of action accrued to the date the underlying damages are paid.
In Caston v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co., 08 the court of appeals affirmed an award of prejudgment interest under section
1343.03(C) of the Ohio Revised Code on damages recovered for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.1 0 9 The court determined that by failing to engage in settlement negotiations prior to
trial, and by making an unreasonable offer during trial, the party
required to pay had "failed to make a good faith effort to settle the
case." 1 0 Because the receiving party had reasonably offered to settle, the requirements of section 1343.03(C) were met and the court
awarded interest."' The court of appeals reviewed an action in
which interest was awarded under section 1343.03(C) for a medical
malpractice claim in Hicks v. Warren General Hospital."2 The
court reviewed the relative positions of the parties during pretrial
and trial and found that the plaintiffs had made a good faith effort
under the statute by having offered to settle for an amount less
than the ultimate verdict, and awarded prejudgment interest." 3 In
neither Caston nor Hicks did the court of appeals look to standards other than those raised in the statute, nor did either court
review the liquidity of the claims.
Prior to the amendment of section 1343.03(C) to include tort actions, Ohio courts had held that an award of prejudgment interest
on damages resulting from torts was discretionary with the factfinder." 4 It is unclear whether the common law discretionary
awards of interest on damages arising from tortious conduct are
still available if the statutory standard is not met."0

C. New York Law
Prejudgment interest is recoverable as a matter of law on dam107. Id. See Hicks v. Warren General Hosp., No. 3345, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. May 4,
1984); Caston v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., No. 10-008, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1984).
108. No. 10-008, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1984).

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. No. 3345, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1984).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N.E. 409 (1890); Rowley v.
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
115. There is little legislative history regarding the intent of the amendment to section
1343.03. House Bill 189, H.R. 189, 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. (Baldwin), provides that the bill
was amended "to specify rules governing the computation period for interest on judgments
rendered in civil actions based on tortious conduct." Id. See supra note 100.
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ages awarded due to tortious interference with property." 6 Under
New York law, a contract right has been held to be a property interest.117 Therefore, prejudgment interest is recoverable on property losses resulting from tortious actions such as fraud." 8 In
Flamm v.Noble,"19 the Court of Appeals of New York held that
prejudgment interest was awardable as of right on the loss caused
by the defendant's fraudulent representations in selling stock to
the plaintiff. 12 0 Under New York law, therefore, statutory prejudgment interest would also be awardable as a matter of law on damages received for fraudulent representation.
IV. RECOVERY OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: QUESTION OF FACT OR
MATTER OF LAW?

A.

Pennsylvania Law

In accordance with the principles set forth in section 337(a) of
the Restatement, Pennsylvania law provides that where there is a
breach of contract to pay a definite sum of money or to render
performance of ascertainable value, the court must award the legal
rate of interest as a matter of law.' 2 ' In Palmgreen v. Palmer's Garage,"2' 2 the supreme court reaffirmed this longstanding principle:
"In all cases of contract interest is allowable at the legal rate from
the time payment is withheld after it has become the duty of the
debtor to make such payment; allowance of interest does not depend upon discretion but is a legal right."' 23 If the debt is unliquidated and interest is thus not awardable as a matter of law, delay
damages in the nature of interest may be awarded at the discretion
116. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5001(a) (McKinney 1963). See Mount Sinai Hosp. v. BorgWarner Corp., 527 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
117. See De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346, 349, 200 N.E.2d
557, 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 657, 660 (1964).
118. See id. at 348, 200 N.E.2d at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 659; Flamm v. Noble, 296 N.Y.
262, 72 N.E.2d 886 (1947).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 264, 72 N.E.2d at 888. See also De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14
N.Y.2d 346, 200 N.E.2d 557, 251 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1964), in which the court awarded prejudgment interest on damages in an action for tortious interference with contract. Id. at 348, 200
N.E.2d at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
121. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 337(a). See supra note 1.
122. 383 Pa. 105, 117 A.2d 721 (1955).
123. Id. at 108, 117 A.2d at 722 (1955). See also Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661
F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1981); Miller v. Reading, 369 Pa. 471, 475-76, 87 A.2d 223, 225 (1952);
Gold & Co. v. Northeast Theater Corp., 281 Pa. Super. 69, 76, 421 A.2d 1151, 1154 (1980).
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124

B.

Ohio Law.

Interest under section 1343.03 of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated is awarded as a matter of law."2 5 In such cases, interest is
awarded as a legal incident to the claim; the question is not submitted to the jury. 2 6 Ohio law continues to provide that interest
awarded on unliquidated and not readily ascertainable claims is
27
awarded in the discretion of the jury.
Section 1343.03 of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated has been
28
amended to also include the award of interest in tort actions.
Because interest under section 1343.03 is awarded by operation of
law, 2 9 interest under section 1343.03(C) on a claim arising out of
tortious conduct should be awarded as a matter of law if the standards of the statute are met. 13 0
C.

New York Law

Prejudgment interest under section 5001 of the New York Civil
Practice Law is awarded as a matter of law.' 3 ' Although the interest is awarded as a matter of law, the jury should be asked to affix
the dates on which the losses occurred so that the court, when
computing interest under section 5001(b), may begin the computation before the date the action commenced. 132 It is awarded as a
124. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
125. Jeppe v. Blue Cross of N.E. Ohio, 67 Ohio App. 2d 87, 425 N.E.2d 947 (1980).
Accord Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 976, 995 (S.D. Ohio
1975) (stating that "prejudgment interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay
liquidated claims when due."); Hobson v. Eaton, 327 F. Supp. 74, 77 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(awarding interest as a matter of right from the time money became due and payable under
a contract).
126. Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N.E. 409 (1890); Jeppe v. Blue Cross
of N.E. Ohio, 67 Ohio App. 2d 87, 425 N.E.2d 947 (1980); Hunter v. Dunn, 16 Ohio App. 2d
109, 242 N.E.2d 595 (1968).
127. See Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 995; Hobson
v. Eaton, 327 F. Supp. at 77.
128. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(C) (Page Supp. 1983). See also supra discussion at note 91.
129. Jeppe v. Blue Cross of N.E. Ohio, 67 Ohio App. 2d at 93, 425 N.E.2d at 952.
130. See Caston v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., No. 10-008, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
23, 1984).
131. United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 878 (2d Cir. 1976) Mount
Sinai Hosp v. Borg-Warner Corp., 527 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
132. See Gelco Builders & Burjay Constr. Corp. v. Simpson Corp., 301 N.Y.S.2d 728,
731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
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matter of law on damages arising from breach of contract
1 4
from interference with property.
V.

3

or

RATE OF INTEREST

A.

Legal Rate

The statutory legal rate of interest under Pennsylvania law is six
percent per annum;' $5 under Ohio law is ten percent per annum; 3 6
37
and under New York law is nine percent per annum.
B.

Contractual Agreement to Pay a Specified Rate

1. Pennsylvania Law
In accordance with section 337(a) of the Restatement,138 the
courts have held that where the parties agree to a rate of interest
to be accrued if payment is delayed beyond the due date, the contracted rate, rather than the legal rate, is recoverable. 3 9
2.

Ohio Law

Section 1343.03(A) of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated expressly provides that the rate of interest specified in a written con40
tract on money due and payable supersedes the legal rate.1
3.

New York Law

Under New York law, the parties can agree to a rate of interest
other than that specified by statute; the contracted rate supersedes
133. See Earnest v. Donald Deskey Assocs., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
134. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5001(a) (McKinney 1963); Mount Sinai Hosp. v. BorgWarner Corp., 527 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
135. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 202 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
136. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(A) (Page Supp. 1983). See also Hunter v. Dunn,
16 Ohio App. 2d 109, 242 N.E.2d 595 (1968).
137. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5004 (McKinney 1983). See, e.g., Mount Sinai Hosp. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 527 F. Supp. 922, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding prejudgment interest
at the rate set forth in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5004 (McKinney 1983)).

138.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 337(a) (1932). See supra note 1.

139. See O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. Taleghani, 525 F. Supp. 750, 762 (E.D. Pa.
1981). Cf. Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 Watts & Serg. 51, 60 (1842). A different rule is applied
where the parties agree to a rate of interest to be applied prior to the payment due date
rather than after it. In such case, the party in default is liable for the contracted rate until
the time of default and liable for the legal rate thereafter. Miller v. Reading, 369 Pa. 471,
476-77, 87 A.2d 223, 226 (1952); Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 Watts & Serg. 51, 60 (1842).
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(A) (Page Supp. 1983). See also Hobson v. Eaton,
327 F. Supp. 74, 77 (1970), and Hackett v. Kripke, 62 Ohio App. 89, 94, 23 N.E.2d 438, 440
(1939), which provide that a contract for interest will be enforced.

Prejudgment Interest
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the statutory rate. 14 1
C.

Simple or Compound Interest

1. Pennsylvania Law
Under Pennsylvania law, unless the parties have expressly contracted for the payment of compound interest, compound interest
is not allowed." 2 Even a clause fixing a time for the payment of
interest does not constitute a provision for a method of computa13
tion other than simple. 4
Section 337(a) of the Restatement, regarding awards of interest
on damages arising from a breach of contract to pay a liquidated
sum, is in accord with the general law of Pennsylvania.144 If the
parties have not contracted otherwise, under Pennsylvania law any
award of interest granted on a claim for damages arising from non4
payment of the purchase price would accrue simple interest.1 1
There is some authority for an award of compound interest at
the discretion of the fact-finder in an action for restitution."' In
Sack v. Feinman 4 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted a passage indicating that compound interest may be assessed in an
award for restitution. 148 Although the courts have interpreted Sack
v. Feinman as permitting discretionary awards of compound interest in restitution cases, 14 9 there appear to be no cases in which
such awards were actually granted. Where a party is suing for
breach of a promise to pay under the Restatement, rather than for
restitution, it may not use this authority as argument for com141. See Secular v. Royal Athletic Surfacing Co., 66 A.D.2d 761, 411 N.Y.S.2d 615
(1978); In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1945) (decided under New
York law); Zimmerman v. Klauber, 139 A.D. 26, 123 N.Y.S. 642 (1910).
142. Stokely v. Thompson, 34 Pa. 210, 212 (1859); Murray v. Prudential Ins. Co., 144
Pa. Super. 178, 183-85, 18 A.2d 820, 822 (1941). In Murray, the superior court stated the
principle that parties to a contract are deemed to have intended that interest accrue only on
the principal amount unless the parties have provided for a different method of computation. Id. at 184, 18 A.2d at 822.
143. Id. at 183-84, 18 A.2d at 822. Thus, the superior court held that the the language,
"with interest at the rate of five percent per annum, payable annually in advance," id., did
not constitute a contractual agreement for other than simple interest.
144. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337(a) (1932) ("If the parties have not by contract determined otherwise, simple interest . . . is recoverable ....
").
145. See Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
146. See Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 413 A.2d 1059 (1980).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 163, 413 A.2d at 1064-65.
149. See Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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pound interest. 150

2.

Ohio Law

Compound interest has long been disfavored by Ohio law. 151,
However, where there has been a default of payment of interest
when due, interest is computed on the overdue interest.1 52 If the
language in the contract constitutes an agreement for the payment
of interest at a certain time, interest will be computed on any over'
due payments of interest. 53
3.

New York Law

Compound interest is strongly disfavored under New York
law.154 Prejudgment interest awarded under section 5001 of the
New York Civil Practice Law is not compounded.' 55 Even an express agreement to compound interest will not be enforced unless
it was entered into by the parties after the interest had accrued.'
Prejudgment interest awarded under New York law, therefore,
would not be compounded. Even if the language set forth in the
agreement is construed to be an agreement for compound interest,
it is void as against public policy because the agreement was entered into prior to the accrual of the interest.'
150. See Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 611 F.2d at 296-97.
151. See, e.g., Averill Coal & Oil Co. v. Verner, 22 Ohio St. 372 (1872).
152. E.g., State v. Village of Brooklyn, 141 Ohio St. 593, 49 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1943).
153. In the following cases, Ohio courts have held that certain language does not constitute an agreement to pay interest at a certain time: Ohio College of Dental Surgery v.
Rosenthal, 45 Ohio St. 183, 184, 190 (1887) ("J. B. Smith is entitled to one share of the real
estate property of the college, drawing an interest of 6 per cent."); Patterson v. McNeeley ex
rel. Hatcher, 16 Ohio St. 348, 349, 354 (1865) ("The above to be at ten percent interest
annually"); Gruhler v. Hossapaus, 195 N.E.2d 387, 392 (P. Ct. 1963) ("[W]ith interest at 5%
per annum"). In Patterson,the court held that if the word "paid" were inserted into the
phrase "ten percent annually," the agreement would have become an agreement for compound interest. Patterson v. McNeeley, 16 Ohio St. at 352. In fact, in all of the cases in
which it was held that there was an agreement for the payment of the interest at a certain
time, the pertinent contract language contained the word "payable" or "paid." See State v.
Village of Brooklyn, 141 Ohio St. 593, 49 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1943); Cook v. Courtright, 40
Ohio St. 248 (1883); Cramer v. Lepper, 26 Ohio St. 59 (1875); Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio
St. 11 (1866).
154. See, e.g., In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 1945)
(decided under New York law).
155. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. § 5001 (McKinney 1963). See, e.g., Morse v. Swank, Inc., 520 F.
Supp. 829, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding simple prejudgment interest from 1977 through
1981).

156. Morse v. Swank, 520 F. Supp. at 830.
157. See In re American Fuel & Power Co., 115 F.2d at 478.
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Rate of Discretionary Tort Delay Damages

1. Pennsylvania Law
Common law delay damages awarded on tort and other unliquidated claims generally have been awarded at the statutory rate. 1 8
In Peterson v. Crown Financial Corp.,16 9 the Third Circuit held
that at least in equitable actions, the fact-finder has discretion
under Pennsylvania law to award rates of interest higher or lower
than the rate set by statute. 160 Later, in American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Machine Corp.,16 ' the Third Circuit held that the discretionary rate set forth in Peterson did not apply to awards of common
6 2 The
law damages for delay in tort actions."
court suggested that
the discretion to award interest at a rate higher than that prescribed by statute applies only in actions for restitution.6 3
Prejudgment interest has been awarded at rates higher than the
statutory rate in actions for restitution of sums which had been
paid under a wrongful demand where the injured party had borrowed money at a rate higher than the statutory rate for payment
of the claim.' Prejudgment interest in such cases was awarded at
1 65
the rate of the loan.
In accordance with American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Machine
Corp.,'6 6 any prejudgment interest awarded on tort damages would
be computed at the statutory rate. When there is no claim for restitution of any funds paid under wrongful demand, interest at a
discretionary rate is not awardable either.
2.

Ohio Law

The rate of delay damages under Ohio law is not calculated at
the discretion of the fact-finder, but rather is determined by stat158. See, e.g., American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1057 (3d Cir.
1982); Van Ripper v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 561 F. Supp. 26, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
aff'd, 707 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir. 1983); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States
Lines, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 671, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
159. 661 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1981).
160. Id. at 298.
161. 686 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1982).
162. Id. at 1057.
163. Id. at 1057 n.5.
164. See Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Carl Beasley
Ford, Inc. v. Borroughs, 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir.
1973).
165. See Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. at 116; Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v.
Borroughs, 361 F. Supp. at 334.
166. 686 F.2d at 1057.
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ute. 11 7 Under Ohio law, the rate of return for prejudgment interest
on tort damages is ten percent. 0 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

The law of the State of New York is much more liberal than that
of Pennsylvania or Ohio in granting prejudgment interest on damages for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract or
misrepresentation in contracting. Because New York has eliminated the requirement that the debt be liquidated in order to accrue prejudgment interest as a matter of law, prejudgment interest
is awarded as a matter of law on all of these damages under New
York law. 169
In contrast to the law of New York, the laws of Pennsylvania
and Ohio provide that prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter
of law on breach of contract damages which are liquidated or readily ascertainable. 170 Under Pennsylvania and Ohio law, therefore,
interest accrues as a matter of law on damages such as recovery of
costs of repurchase price, but generally not on lost profits,
pair,1 7 2 and cover damages.1 73 Under both Pennsylvania and Ohio
law, prejudgment interest may be awarded on such breach of contract damages if in the discretion of the7 fact-finder it is necessary
to fairly compensate the injured party.' '
167. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03 (Page Supp. 1983). Section 1343.03(A) of the
Ohio Revised Code provides that "when money becomes due and payable upon ... all judgthe creditor is
ments . . . for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct .
Id. Section
entitled to interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, and no more .
1343.03(B) proceeds to set forth the period of computation of interest on a judgment for the
payment of interest arising out of tortious conduct, and includes the period of prejudgment.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(B) (Page Supp. 1983). Prior to the 1982 amendment of the
statute which specifically incorporated provisions regarding interest awards in tort actions,
the statutory legal rate set forth in 1343.03(A) was applied to discretionary awards of interest on unliquidated claims. See Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F.
Supp. 978, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Therefore, even if discretionary delay damages are still
available under Ohio law, the statutory rate is applicable.
168. See Caston v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., No. 10-008, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
23, 1984).
169. See supra notes 17, 26-27, 72-82, 93, 116-120 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 3, 4, 11, 19-25, 28, 46-62 and accompanying text. Under Pennsylvania law, the term "liquidated" encompasses the concept of "ascertainable," while under
Ohio law the courts use the terms as two different standards. See supra note 11. Under the
law of both states, however, the courts review whether the debt is stated in the contract or is
ascertainable therefrom in determining whether interest is recoverable as a matter of law.
171. See supra notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 83-85, 88-91 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 7-8, 12-13, 32-45, 63-71, 87, 92 and accompanying text. Where it
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Delay damages, in the nature of interest, are awarded on tort
damages under Pennsylvania law at the discretion of the factfinder.'
If, however, tortious interference with contract constitutes interference with property under Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 176 then under Pennsylvania law inter77
est on such damages would be awarded as a matter of law.
Under Ohio law, prejudgment interest on tort damages is awarded
as a matter of law if the requirements of section 1343.03(C) of the
78
Ohio Revised Code are met.
Prejudgment interest is generally awarded at the statutory legal
rate of interest if no other rate is specified in the contract.'"
Under New York law the legal rate is nine percent per annum;8 0
under Pennsylvania law, six percent per annum; 181 and under Ohio
law, ten percent per annum.'82 The interest is not compounded
under the law of Pennsylvania, New York or Ohio. 183 The New
York courts, in contrast with those of Ohio and Pennsylvania, will
84
not enforce a contractual provision for compound interest.
Pamela K. Wiles

has been awarded, the courts have generally found that the wrongdoer acted in bad faith or
was unjustly enriched. See supra notes 33, 68-71 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
176. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
177. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
178. The section 1393.23 requirements appear to be a modification of the common law
test requiring the parties to act in good faith. See supra notes 104-07, 114-15 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 142-57 and accompanying text. But see Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa.
152, 413 A.2d 1059 (1980), which provides some authority under Pennsylvania law for compounding prejudgment interest in the fact-finder's discretion under certain circumstances.
See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 142, 153, 156 and accompanying text.

